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3MAGILL, Senior Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Ronson Corp. (“Ronson”) appeals the district court’s order
granting Defendant-Appellees Steel Partners II, L.P., Steel Partners, L.L.C., Warren
Lichtenstein, and Jack Howard’s (collectively “Steel Partners”) motion to dismiss and
Howard M. Lorber’s separate motion to dismiss Ronson’s complaint as time-barred.  We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  For the reasons stated by the District Court, we
affirm.
I.
On March 11, 1998, Steel Partners filed a Schedule 13D to report its ownership
interest in Ronson, but it did not check the box to indicate that it was acting as part of a
group in acquiring Ronson stock.  Steel Partners has filed several amendments to its
Schedule 13D, none of which disclose group membership.  It is clear from the record that
Ronson suspected Steel Partners’ participation in a group as early as 1999.  In a letter
from Ronson’s CEO, Louis V. Aronson, II, to Steel Partners’ CEO, Warren Lichtenstein,
Aronson uses phrases such as “[w]hile you may believe that you and your secret investor
group are entitled to special treatment and privileges . . . you and your group have not
demonstrated . . . you have boasted to your investor group . . . .”  App. at 159.
On May 16, 2003, Ronson filed a complaint alleging that Steel Partners’ failure to
disclose its group membership violated section 13(d)(3) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3).  The district court dismissed the complaint as time-
4barred because Ronson was on inquiry notice of any alleged group activity since 1999,
but it did not file a complaint until May 16, 2003.  In doing so, the district court rejected
Ronson’s argument that Steel Partners’ subsequent amendments to its Schedule 13D, two
of which were filed within a year prior to Ronson’s complaint, constitute new violations
and should restart the statute of limitations.  
II.
We review the district court’s decision de novo.  Merle v. United States, 351 F.3d
92, 94 (3d Cir. 2003).  A motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-
pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.  Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 279
(3d Cir. 2000). 
Ronson was on inquiry notice, and the statute of limitations period began to run,
when it “‘discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
basis for [its] claim’” against Steel Partners.  In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314,
1325 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 697 F. Supp. 859, 863 (E.D.
Pa. 1988)).  “Whether the plaintiffs, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have
known of the basis for their claims depends on whether they had ‘sufficient information
of possible wrongdoing to place them on “inquiry notice” or to excite “storm warnings”
of culpable activity.’”  Id. (quoting Gruber, 697 F. Supp. at 864).  
5The basis for Ronson’s claim is Steel Partners’ nondisclosure of group activity,
and Ronson had information as early as 1999 to provide a “storm warning” that the
defendants were allegedly acting as a group.  Steel Partners, by continuously failing to
disclose such group membership, has not committed any new violations.  See Green v.
Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 19 F. Supp. 2d 227, 233 (D.N.J. 1998).  Thus, Ronson’s
complaint is time-barred under both the Securities and Exchange Act’s one-year
limitations period, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c), and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s two-year limitations
period, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1).
Because the District Court correctly granted Steel Partners’ motion and Lorber’s
separate motion to dismiss Ronson’s complaint, we will AFFIRM.
_________________
